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DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT
PREEMPTION AND STATE ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION
Jost L. FERNANDEZ*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE Occupational Safety and Health Act' (OSH Act) and regula-
tions issued by the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion (OSHA) have been the basis of preemption challenges2 to state
environmental statutes that address the dangers of pollution and expo-
sure to toxic substances.3 The state statutes and regulations are
claimed constitutionally defective because, either directly or indirectly,
they regulate occupational safety and health in the workplace, a field
reserved for exclusive federal regulation by judicial interpretation of
the OSH Act.4
The challenged state environmental statutes attempt to regulate
toxic substances and dangerous practices that expose the citizenry to
environmental and health hazards. Because such harmful substances
and practices often are created or exist in manufacturing workplaces,
the states' efforts frequently intrude into the field already occupied by
Congress through the OSH Act5 and OSHA regulations. 6 The problem
states face is compounded by broad judicial interpretation of "occu-
pation of the field" preemption. Based on the concept that the OSH
* Assistant Professor, Rutgers University School of Law-Camden; B.S., 1980, Edison
University; J.D., 1985, Rutgers University School of Law-Camden.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988).
2. These challenges have been based on the Supremacy Clause. U.S. CONST. art. Vl.
3. See infra notes 28-43 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 58-76 and accompanying text.
5. As early as 1974, it was asserted that the "enactment of the federal Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970 ... had preempted the field of employee health and safety." Columbus
Coated Fabrics v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 498 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1974). The states' intru-
sion may be incidental, as part of a general directive or restriction, or it may be direct, as an
attempt to correct a perilous practice or control the handling of a dangerous substance.
6. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000 (1993) (listing the substances subject to regulation by
OSHA). The content of the list makes obvious why a state regulation attempting to protect its
citizens' risk of exposure to toxic chemicals would tend to coincide with OSHA regulations. See
also infra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
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Act represents a political "compromise" among the legislators to im-
pose the "right" amount of regulation, courts have preempted non-
conflicting coincidental state regulations whether or not they actually
conflict with the OSH Act.7
This Article explores the underpinnings of the judicial conceptuali-
zation of preemption from a traditional approach and from a law and
economics or public choice point of view. It finds that neither the
former's "deliberative" view of the legislative process nor the latter's
concept of a "political bargain" among legislators and discrete minor-
ities supports many courts' reasoning.' As a result of the current judi-
cial approaches, the OSH Act's preemption has the potential to
severely limit the states' ability to exercise police powers in the envi-
ronmental arena. Recently, the United States Supreme Court afforded
states some relief in several cases that appeared to represent a swing
toward upholding state regulation unless there exists clear conflict
with federal law.9 Responding to this perceived relaxation of the pre-
emption analysis, federal appellate courts developed several "purpose
based tests" and at least one "policy based test" to uphold state envi-
ronmental statutes regulating some activity already controlled by
OSHA under the OSH Act.' 0 However, in the most recent United
States Supreme Court case construing the OSH Act's preemptive ef-
fect, Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, the Court
rejected the purpose tests and offered a preemption analysis based on
the "impact" of a state statute on the federal regulatory scheme."
Gade illustrates the unsettled state of the preemption doctrine. The
justices in the plurality were unable to agree as to whether the OSH
Act expressly or impliedly preempted the Illinois statutes involved. In-
deed, the Court was split 5-to-4 as to whether these statutes were pre-
empted at all. Prior to Gade, the preemption doctrine in
environmental cases faced criticism. Judges were accused of applying
7. See infra notes 151-179 and accompanying text.
8. It is important to distinguish the legislative bargain predicted by public choice theory
from the concept of a political compromise that the courts have applied. The traditional*myth of
the "political compromise" is based on the existence of a collective intent to enact a particular
piece of legislation that represents agreement among legislators as to how the public is best
served. Public choice explains legislative results as the bargain that results in the interplay be-
tween legislators responding out of their self-interest in getting reelected and discrete minorities
exercising their political buying power to obtain beneficial "rentseeking" legislation. See infra
notes 151-179 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 220-23 (1983) (noting that courts should not seek out conflict where
none existed); Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982) (requiring "irreconcila-
ble" conflict to preempt); see also Josd L. Fernandez, The Purpose Test: Shielding State Envi-
ronmental Statutes from the Sword of Preemption, 41 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1201, 1203 n. I1 (1990).
10. See Fernandez, supra note 9, at 1203; see also infra notes 77-107 and accompanying
text.
1I. 112 S. Ct. 2374(1992).
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the doctrine to obtain desired results. As one commentator stated,
"[a]t times the courts have applied preemption doctrines broadly to
invalidate certain state laws, while at other times they dig deeply and
search for an avenue by which the state environmental regulation may
be saved. . . . [T]raditional tests are 'constantly challenged to meet
the changing moral climate of the nation.""?
Recently, Professor William Eskridge offered a "dynamic" statu-
tory interpretation analysis based on applying current societal values
to interpret statutes that are textually ambiguous or present a conflict
between their legislative history and the results of their text. 3 Where
statutory ambiguity exists, Eskridge argues that interpreting the stat-
ute in harmony with present-day values would advance the public's
interest. 4 This Article recognizes that the OSH Act lacks an express
preemption provision and urges the application of a "dynamic pur-
pose" approach as developed herein to interpret the OSH Act's scope
of implied preemption. Further, this Article calls for rejection of the
"occupation of the field" standard as the basis for preemption analy-
sis. Instead, this Article advances an analysis whereby implied pre-
emption would depend on whether the state regulation presents an
obstacle or actual conflict to the "dynamic" statutory purpose of a
federal act. The Article notes that some federal statutes, by the plain
language of their statements of purpose, indicate the need for a
changing or dynamic level of regulation. These "dynamic purpose"
statutes are particularly appropriate for rejecting the traditional judi-
cial search for the mindset of the original legislators. Specifically, ap-
plication of the dynamic purpose method to the OSH Act may be
useful to determine the scope of implied preemptive intent that should
be imputed to Congress. Finally, the Article demonstrates that limi-
ting the scope of implied preemption will better allow the states to
carry out their role as laboratories of legislative experimentation and
to safeguard the states' efficient exercise of police power.
II. THE PROBLEM
The OSH Act regulates the occupational safety and health field
through regulations or "standards" issued by OSHA, and through the
12. James E. Preston, The Environmental Shell Game in the Green Mountains: Is Ver-
mont's CFC Law Hidden Under Federal Preemption, the Commerce Clause or Vermont's Police
Powers?, 41 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1251, 1255 (1990).
13. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1479 (1987) (urging that statutes be interpreted "dynamically," that is, "in light of their present
societal, political and legal context"); see also RONALD DWORKiN, LAW'S EMPIRE 313-54 (1986);
Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204
(1980).
14. See Eskridge, supra note 13, at 1481.
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OSH Act's "general duty clause."" Practices and methods regulated
by OSHA include "protective measures" such as warnings, protective
equipment and medical examinations.' 6 In addition, OSHA may adopt
temporary emergency standards. 7 The "general duty" clause imposes
an obligation on employers to keep the workplace "free from recog-
nized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious
physical harm.""
Even a superficial review of the scope of OSHA regulations prom-
ulgated in response to the OSH Act's mandate illustrates the broad
scope of possible friction between the federal scheme and state efforts
to regulate in the environmental arena.' 9 Under section 1900 of the
OSHA regulations, conflict may arise from the regulation of air pollu-
tants, 20 noise,21 exposure to radiation, 22 regulation of hazardous mate-
rials in general,23 handling of hazardous wastes,24 the adoption of
emergency response procedures including fire preplanning, 25 chemical
labeling26 and the regulation of particular toxic chemical substances.2 7
Even these broad areas, however, do not detail a comprehensive list of
possible friction between states and the federal government. The op-
portunity for conflict between state laws and OSHA regulations de-
pends on how broadly courts interpret the OSHA provisions and on
the many types of regulations a state may enact to protect its citizens
from environmental and health hazards.
15. An OSHA standard "requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more prac-
tices, means, methods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide
safe or healthful employment and places of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1988).
16. Id. § 655(b)(7).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 655(c) (1988) (requiring a finding that employees are exposed to'grave dan-
ger).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(I) (1988).
19. This Article treats the terms "environment" and "environmental" to include broad
aspects of the natural and human environment. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370, 4331(a) (1969).
20. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000 (1993) (exposure to air contaminants); id. § 1910.1001 (per-
missible asbestos exposure limits); id. § 1910.94 (ventilation); id. § 1915.32-.36 (cleaning sol-
vents, paint removers, painting, and the use of flammable and chemical liquids in surface
preparation for painting); id. § 1915,51 (ventilation when welding, cutting and heating).
21. Id. § 1910.95 (occupational noise exposure).
22. Id. § 1910.96(e) (packaging of radioactive materials); id. § 1910.960) (storage of radio-
active materials).
23. Id. §§ 1910.101-119 (regulating the use and storage of gases, flammable liquids, explo-
sives, liquified petroleum).
24. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.120(b)(l)(iv) (operations by contractors and subcontractors); id. §
1910.120(k) (decontamination procedures); id. § 1910.120() (hazardous waste containers); id. §
1910.120(e) (training of employees exposed to hazardous substances).
25. See id. § 1910.155-.165.
26. See id. § 1910.1200 (OSHA's hazard communication standard).
27. See id. § 1910.1000 subpart Z.
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One thing is certain, a significant number of OSH Act preemption
challenges to state environmental provisions have already occurred.28
Cases have included challenges to regulation of hazardous waste
sites,29 tort liability standards,30 oil refinery pressure vessels,3" licensing
and training of asbestos removal workers,32 control over chemical con-
tainer labeling,3" asbestos removal regulation,34 chemical labeling,"
toxic chemical labeling and distribution,3 6 toxic hazard disclosure, 7
closing of a dangerous industrial plant,3" supervision of testing labora-
tories,3 9 right to bring a state damage claim against asbestos manufac-
28. The conflict between federal regulation and state environmental statutes is not limited
to those cases involving the OSH Act. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617 (1978) (interstate movement of waste); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978)
(oil tanker regulation); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973)
(airport noise pollution); Askew v. American Waterways, 411 U.S. 325 (1973) (no-fault liability
for clean-up of oil spills); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911) (transportation
of oil resources); American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 517 P.2d 691 (Or. Ct.
App. 1973) (clean-up of highways). See also Note, Emasculating State Environmental Enforce-
ment: The Supreme Court's Selective Adoption of the Preemption Doctrine, 16 WM. & MARY J.
ENV'L. L. 31, 34 (1991) ("Since 1976, the Court has diluted, subverted, and finally reversed the
previously prevailing presumption against preemption of state environmental laws.").
29. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374 (1992) (holding
Illinois law regulating hazardous waste-site operators and workers preempted by the OSH Act).
30. Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding OSHA provisions did not
preempt state tort action for workplace exposure to epichlorohydrin), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
993 (1992); Schweiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 922 F.2d 473 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that
OSHA provisions did not preempt state tort action for wrongful discharge of whistleblowing
employee).
31. Sun Ref. &" Mktg. Co. v. Brennan, 921 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1990) (appealing district
court's finding that OSHA preempted Ohio's regulation of unfired pressure vessels at petroleum
refineries).
32. Associated Indus. of Mass. v. Snow, 898 F.2d 274 (1st Cir. 1990)'(holding that OSHA
did not preempt state's asbestos abatement statute and regulations).
33. New Jersey Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 868 F.2d 621 (3d Cir.) (holding New
Jersey Worker and Community Right to Know Act container labeling provisions not preempted
by OSHA), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 920 (1989).
34. Environmental Encapsulating Corp..v. City of New York, 855 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1988)
(holding that OSHA regulations on asbestos exposure levels and employee training requirements
preempted city's respiratory protection and medical surveillance requirements).
35. Ohio Mfrs. Ass'n v. City of Akron, 801 F.2d 824 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding city's "right
to know" ordinance preempted by OSHA hazard communication standard), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 801 (1987).
36. Manufactures Ass'n of Tri-County v. Knepper, 801 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding
that certain schemes of state "right to know" act were preempted as to employees in manufac-
turing sector), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 815 (1987).
37. West Virginia Mfrs. Assoc. v. West Virginia, 714 F.2d 308 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that
Act did not preempt state statute requiring employers to disclose to employees hazards of expo-
sure to toxic chemicals).
38. Columbus Coated Fabrics v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 498 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1974)
(appeal from district court's finding that OSHA preemption of state law prevented commission
from holding hearing.to determine whether plant presented danger to employees and frequent-
ers).
39. Dash, Straus & Goodhue, Inc. v. City of Chicago, No. 90-C-2305, 1991 WL 171269
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turers for the costs of removal from public schools, 4° employee injury
reporting requirements, 4 and criminal prosecution of corporate pollu-
ters. 42 As states attempt to remedy perceived inadequacies of federal
environmental protection laws, and as more areas of concern particu-
lar to a state are discovered, the potential for conflict between the
OSH Act and state legislation will increase. 43
Ill. PREEMPTION
Judicial tests for preemption accommodate several basic principles
of federalism, including the supremacy of the federal Constitution,
statutes, and regulations over state laws, 4 and the fact that states re-
serve the balance of legislative power through the Tenth Amend-
ment.4 1 In addition, courts must address the need to preserve a state's
role as guardian of the citizenry through the exercise of state police
power. By determining the fate of state legislation in preemption
cases, courts allocate legislative power between state and federal gov-
ernment in what is primarily a political exercise. In the settlement of
the resulting political tussles, the test courts have applied is far from a
precise jurisprudential tool. The resulting uncertainty is most severe in
instances of implied preemption, where cases demonstrate that courts
(N.D. Il1. Aug. 27, 1991) (preempting in part the city's code testing laboratories provision im-
posing requirements for the sale of electrical appliances and electrical equipment in Chicago).
40. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 197 v. W.R. Grace & Co., 752 F. Supp. 286 (D. Minn.
1990) (finding school district's state claim for reimbursement of asbestos removal costs not pre-
empted by OSHA regulations).
41. P & Z Co. v. District of Columbia, 408 A.2d 1249 (D.C. 1979) (holding OSHA regula-
tions did not preempt the Washington, D.C. Industrial Safety Act).
42. People v. Fymm, 563 N.E.2d I (N.Y. 1990) (concluding that New York's ability to
prosecute corporate actors for mercury contamination of the workplace not preempted), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1085 (1991).
43. As Judge Cudahy stated: "In recent years, popular concern about the environment has
spurred legislators at all levels of government to enact laws aimed at abating existing pollu-
tion .... The resulting patchwork of legislation and regulation . .. has repeatedly generated
issues of federal preemption of state and local laws." National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n
v. Killian, 918 F.2d 671, 673 (7th Cir. 1990), aff'd sub nom. Gade v. National Solid Wastes
Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 374 (1992).
44.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
45. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
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may treat the same situation as one of "conflict" or "occupation of
the field.' "4
The politically conservative majority of the United States Supreme
Court would presumably shield states from too great an intrusion
from the federal government in the running of state affairs.47 How-
ever, the cases illustrate that conservatives may support greater federal
control if the states are perceived as founts of activist legislation on a
particular regulatory subject. 8 Consequently, the Court's preemption
decisions may be categorized into two types with different outcomes.
First, the federal intrusion may be directed at a state's governmental
power, where a high standard of conflict will be required before the
Court finds preemption of a state act that directly involves the opera-
tion of local government. Second, the federal limit may be applied to
curtail a state's regulatory power in a particular area of activity. In
these instances, depending on the subject matter, the Court may need
to find only a slight conflict before finding preemption. The Court's
willingness to restrict states in regulatory areas is evidenced by the fact
that Justice O'Connor, "the Court's most assertive advocate of feder-
alism, 49 is the author of the plurality decision in Gade. The fluctua-
tion of the rigidity in applying the preemption test is troublesome
because it opens the Court to accusations of legislating from the
bench and of "deciding for results." ' 0
The remainder of this section will review the traditional preemption
tests and the different purpose-based tests that courts have developed.
This section also details the problems associated with these tests and
46. The Court, "in considering the validity of state laws ... touching the same subject [as
the federal law], has made use of the following expressions: conflicting; contrary to; occupying
the field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and in-
terference." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
47. The political nature of the preemption analysis of the current Court members has been
noted. See Charles Rothfeld, Federalism in a ConservatiVe Supreme Court, PUaLls, Summer
1992, 21, 30 (1992) ("Any reflection [of the conservative majority's lack of interest in protecting
state autonomy] in the Court's decisions likely will occur in preemption cases, which involve
assertions of state regulatory authority."). Rothfeld notes that despite the Court's conservative
character, under the Court's preemption analysis it is hard to predict a uniform trend of when
the Court will either preempt or bow to the states. He states that the current majority displays:
increased willingness to preclude federal interference with, or direct regulation of,
state and local governments. It remains an open question, however, whether the Court
will understand federalism principles to protect state regulatory efforts as well as state
governments themselves ... when the beneficiaries of its rulings include those who
are turning to state governments as bastions of government activism.
Id. at 21-22.
48. Id. at 30.
49. Id. at 23; see Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (en-
couraging the use of states as laboratories for experimentation).
50. See supra note 47, at 21.
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how courts have responded to these difficulties in recent decisions and
modes of analysis.
A. Express Preemption
It is axiomatic that once Congress has legislated on a subject within
its constitutional powers a state may not stand as an "obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."" The "purposes and objectives of Congress" may be ex-
pressed in the language of the statute, put forth in its subject matter,
or implied by the character and language of the act or federal regula-
tion. When Congress' intent to preempt is expressed, determining the
fate of a conflicting state act is a relatively simple task involving statu-
tory language interpretation.
B. Conflict Preemption
When the intent of Congress is not expressed, however, preemption
must then be decided by implication. Because congressional acts must
be imbued with the intent to bring to fruition the substance of the act,
any state law which conflicts with the achievement of the federal goal
must yield. First, such conflict may be direct, as when a state allows
what Congress forbids or forbids what Congress allows.52 Second, the
conflict may be indirect, as when a state's attempt to regulate an area
not covered by a federal act nevertheless raises obstacles that make the
federal goal impossible. 53 Third, a state may not significantly interfere
with the operation of a federal regulatory scheme. 54 Such interference
occurs when a state, through the effect of its regulations or laws, dis-
courages compliance with a federal act."5 Fourth, there is jurispruden-
tial-conflict preemption, where Congress expressly, or impliedly
through occupying a field of regulation, evinces an intent to reserve a
regulatory area for exclusive federal control.' 6 Because of the broad
scope of federal regulation, jurisprudential-conflict preemption has
rapidly become the developing norm. 7
51. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1940); see also Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430
U.S. 519, 526 (1977).
52. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
53. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-45 (1963).
54. English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
55. Id.
56. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
57. Kenneth L. Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L. REv.
515, 519. Hirsch notes that preemption conflict-based problems are pervasive, having developed
over the "entire range of federal regulation." He notes that the fields include labor law, mari-
time law, agricultural marketing, quarantine, sedition, alien registration, patents, governmental
procurement and state taxation and regulation of federal contracts. Id. at 516.
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C. Jurisprudential-Conflict Preemption
The Court has established the principle that "when Congress acts
upon [a] . . .subject all state laws covering the same field are neces-
sarily superseded by reason of the supremacy of the national author-
ity.'"' In those instances where Congress expresses its intent to
exclude states from an area of regulation, Congress reduces the role of
courts to defining the scope of the federal act. However, in cases
where congressional intent is not clearly voiced, courts may explore
the federal regulatory scheme to detect whether the federal legislation
"occupies a field" of regulation. 9 Once a court finds that a field is
occupied, it will formalistically infer a congressional intent to preempt
all state legislation in that field.60
Courts predicate the congressional intent to occupy a field upon a
finding that it is "the clear and manifest purpose of Congress" that
an area be exclusively federally regulated 6 However, there are no
clear or objective standards for the Court to apply when inferring
such a "clear and manifest purpose." In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp. ,62 the Court tried to explain the inquiry:
The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it. Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the
federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.
Likewise, the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the
character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same
purpose.6
Supplanting these concerns is the need for national uniformity to
avoid unduly burdening interstate commerce.6 The Rice test, how-
58. New York Cent. R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 148 (1917).
59. Implied field preemption analysis, however, is indistinguishable from conflict preemp-
tion analysis. As Justice Souter stated, "[a]lthough we have chosen to use the term 'conflict' pre-
emption, we could as easily have stated that the promulgation of a federal safety and health
standard 'pre-empts the field' for any nonapproved state law regulating the same safety and
health issue." Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2386 n.2
(1992); see also English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79-80 n.5 (1990).
60. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984).
61. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146 (1963).
62. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
63. Id. at 230.
64. See New York Cent. R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917). This is a case of occupation
of a field because it affects "matters in which the Nation as a whole is interested and there are
weighty considerations why the controlling law should be uniform and not change at every state
line." Id. at 149.
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ever, explains little. It fails to provide a list of factors that courts can
balance in determining just how pervasive a particular scheme may be,
or how dominant the federal interest may be in a particular field. 6 As
a result, the courts have exercised great latitude in deciding whether a
field of activity is "occupied," and the test can become a subjective
inquiry as to whether the state initiative should be preempted. 6
Field preemption analysis equates congressional regulation in a field
with the intent to exclude state laws even if the state legislation seems
to advance or complement the congressional purpose. In striking state
regulation that supplements a federal statutory goal, the Court has
relied on the myth that federal statutes represent an underlying politi-
cal compromise to legislate "to a point no further. ' 67 Accordingly,
there is no need for evidence of actual conflict. It is enough to demon-
strate that the state law has an impact or effect on the federally occu-
pied field.68
The development of this formulation can be traced to cases involv-
ing the desire to avoid the Balkanization of commercial regulation to
safeguard the uninterrupted flow of commerce. In these early cases
the Court executed a perceived congressional intent to insure that "the
controlling law [regulating commerce] should be uniform and not
change at every state line." 69 Consequently, any state laws regulating
in the federally occupied field, regardless of whether they conflicted
or complemented federal law regulating commerce, were preempted
65. Indeed, a basis for dissent has been that the Court has failed to show the existence of
particular factors required for occupying a field. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 515
(1956) (Reed, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority was incorrect in finding occupation of a
field without demonstrating that congressional regulation is pervasive in the field).
66. The United States Supreme Court has been accused of letting its interpretation of a
state statute have greater import than the "metaphorical sign-language of 'occupation of the
field."' See Roger C. Crampton, Pennsylvania v. Nelson: A Case Study in Federal Pre-emption,
26 U. Cm. L. REa. 85, 87 (1958).
There have been periods when the Court appeared to favor state interests and other periods
when federal interests have been read expansively to preclude state regulation. Compare Charles-
ton & W. Carolina Ry. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915) (finding sufficient
grounds for preemption where Congress had regulated in the same subject area) with Mintz v.
Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, 350 (1933) (requiring that the intent of Congress to occupy the field
"definitely and clearly appear") and H.P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79, 85 (1939)
(requiring that congressional preemptive intent to occupy a field be "definitely expressed").
67. "[T]he legislation of Congress, in what it does prescribe, manifestly indicates that it
does not intend that there shall be any farther legislation to act upon the subject-matter." Prigg
v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 618 (1842); see also Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297,
301 (1961) (Congress "preempted the field and left no room for any supplementary state regula-
tion concerning those same types.").
68. Capital Cities v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984).
69. For a list of preemption cases addressing interference with the flow and congressional
regulation of interstate commerce, see New York Cent. R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 148 n.2
(1917).
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because they interfered with national uniformity. 70 This principle was
mechanically extended to other areas of congressional regulation. 7' In
cases involving the OSH Act, traditional preemption doctrine bans
any complementary state regulation that increases worker safety and
health on grounds that it alters the balance struck by Congress. As the
Article will explain later, however, the belief that there exists a collec-
tive intent behind the OSH Act which would be offended by increased
worker protection is mistaken. 72
The draconian character of field preemption has not gone unchal-
lenged, especially in light of criticism from members of the Court re-
garding the increasing tendency to conclude that Congress intended to
exclude all state regulation regardless of actual conflict with federal
provisions.7 1 Justice Brandeis, for example, argued that the mere fact
that Congress occupied a limited field of regulation does not lead to
the conclusion that Congress intended to exclude all state legislation
on the same subject:
[T]he intent to supersede the exercise by the State of its police power
as to matters not covered by the Federal legislation is not to be
inferred from the mere fact that Congress has seen fit ... to occupy
a limited field. In other words, such intent is not to be implied unless
the act of Congress fairly interpreted is in actual conflict with the law
of the State.7 4
70. As stated in Winfield:
[Ilt cannot be that the state legislatures have a right to interfere, and, as it were, by
way of complement to the legislation of Congress, to prescribe additional regulations,
and what they may deem auxiliary provisions for the same purpose. In such a case, the
legislation of Congress, in what it does prescribe, manifestly indicates that it does not
intend that there shall be any farther legislation to act upon the subject-matter. Its
silence as to what it does not do, is as expressive of what its intention is as the direct
provisions made by it.
Id. at 153 (quoting Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 617 (1842)); see also Missouri
Pac. R.R. v. Porter, 273 U.S. 341, 346 (1927) (state laws "cannot be applied in coincidence with,
as complementary to or as in opposition to, federal enactments which disclose the intention of
Congress to enter a field of regulation that is within its jurisdiction.").
71. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (concluding that the registration of
aliens is a federally occupied field).
72. Even if complementary to the federal law's stated purpose, the state act will not survive
under traditional preemption analysis. See infra notes 204-205 and accompanying text.
73. New York Cent. R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 155 (1917) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 78-89 (1941) (Stone, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
intent to exclude the state should be expressed by Congress or the Court should find a conflict
with the federal law; "Little aid can be derived from the vague and illusory but often repeated
formula that Congress 'by occupying the field' has excluded from it all state legislation.").
74. See Winfield, 244 U.S. at 155.
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Other justices-have voiced similar concerns, arguing that the intent
to exclude the states from an entire field should be supported by the
congressional language in the act or a finding of actual conflict. 75 In-
deed, it was partly in response to this restrictive effect of field pre-
emption that courts developed a new type of preemption test based on
comparing the purposes of the federal and state regulation. 76
D. The Purpose Tests
Cases involving occupation of the field present a special problem to
states because of the wide prohibition inherent in closing an entire
field of regulation to state initiatives. This problem is compounded in
the environmental arena because of the broadness of the issues. Some
courts, in trying to accommodate state regulation of environmental or
general safety and health issues, have developed implied preemption
tests based on comparing the legislative purposes of federal and state
acts. Under such tests, upon discerning that the purpose of a state act
is not the direct regulation of occupational safety and health, courts
have permitted the state regulation to stand if it does not otherwise
conflict with the federal scheme of regulation. These purpose-based
tests, however, have not been universally well received."
A purpose test for implied preemption has surfaced in at least three
variants: the "primary purpose test, '" 78 the "substantial purpose
test ' 79 and the "purpose and effect test." ' 0
75. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 514 (1956) (Reed, J., dissenting) ("[T]his
Court should not void state legislation without a clear mandate from Congress."); Hines, 312
U.S. at 78-79 (Stone, J., dissenting).
With regard to a possible conflict between state and federal regulation, Justice Reed admon-
ishes, "[m]ere fear by courts of possible difficulties does not seem to us in these circumstances a
valid reason for ousting a State from exercise of its police power. Those are matters for legisla-
tive determination." Nelson, 350 U.S. at 519 (Reed. J., dissenting); see also Campbell v. Hus-
sey, 368 U.S. 297, 307-08 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (evidence of clear and manifest
congressional intent is necessary "to justify a finding of a Congressional intent to preempt
merely complimentary legislation").
76. As Lawrence Tribe noted, the Court's application of the preemption test appeared to be
"softening" in instances where the states were regulating areas of particular state interest. Lawr-
ence H. Tribe, California Declines the Nuclear Gamble: Is Such a State Choice Preempted?, 7
ECoLooy L.Q. 679, 687 (1979); see also Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perceptions on
Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 CoLuM. L. Rv. 623 (1975).
77. A principal objection to the purpose tests is that they allow a state to avoid preemption
merely by stating a non-conflicting legislative purpose. Critics of the purpose-based tests insist
that the courts must look at .the effect that the state regulation has on the federal regulatory
scheme. See infra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
78. New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 774 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 492 U.S. 920 (1989).
79. Environmental Encapsulating Corp. v. City of New York, 855 F.2d 48, 57 (2d Cir.
1988).
80. Associated Indus. of Mass. v. Snow, 898 F.2d 274 (1st Cir. 1990).
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1. The Primary Purpose Test
The primary purpose test developed in a series of cases within the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals' jurisdiction involving New Jersey and
Pennsylvania statutes governing the labeling of chemical substances.
Since the state acts provided for the labeling of chemicals in the work-
place and marketplace, they shared jurisdiction with an OSHA regula-
tion called the hazard communication standard.8'
In New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey,82 the New
Jersey Chemical Right to Know Act was the first to be challenged by
the OSHA standard. The district court in Hughey held that the state
act was expressly preempted. On appeal, however, the circuit court
found that some of the labeling provisions and other portions of the
statute were not expressly preempted, and remanded for evidentiary
findings as to possible implied preemption.83
While the district court was conducting these hearings on remand,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided
Manufacturers Ass'n of Tri-County v. Knepper,s4 which challenged
Pennsylvania's chemical labeling statute. In Knepper, the district
court held that provisions of the state act imposing a labeling obliga-
tion on "suppliers" and "employers" were preempted by the OSHA
standard to the extent they required either suppliers or manufacturing
employers to label containers.'- On appeal, the court issued a mixed
decision. It affirmed the district court's finding of express preemption
as to most of the act, including those provisions that attempted to
impose labeling obligations on employers° 6 The court also held, how-
ever, that the labeling provisions addressed to suppliers were not pre-
empted since the OSH Act's regulation of employers did not occupy
the field regulating suppliers. 7 In its analysis, the appellate court re-
lied on its earlier ruling in Hughey:
In Hughey . . . [w]e held that because the primary purpose of the
workplace hazard surveys [a provision of the New Jersey act] was the
promotion of occupational health and safety through hazard
communication, ... [that section of the act] was preempted by
OSHA .... However, because we found that the environmental
81. 29C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1989).
82. 774 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1985).
83. Id. at 596.
84. 801 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 815 (1987).
85. Manufacturers Ass'n of Tri-County v. Knepper, 623 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa. 1985),
aff'd in part and rev"d in part, 801 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 815 (1987).
86. Knepper, 801 F.2d at 139.
87. Id.
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hazard surveys ... had a different purpose, we held that the
environmental hazard ... provisions of the New Jersey Act were not
preempted.'",
The Third Circuit's message in Knepper to the district court consid-
ering Hughey on remand was that, under a primary purpose test, the
issue was whether the purpose of the state act was to inform employ-
ees of workplace hazards, which was the OSHA standard's purpose. 9
When Hughey returned to the Third Circuit from evidentiary hear-
ings, the court affirmed the district court's holding that the New Jer-
sey statute's provisions considered on remand were not preempted, as
they had a primary purpose other than the regulation of workplace
hazards for the protection of employees.9
2. The Substantial Purpose Test
In Environmental Encapsulating Corp. v. City of New York, 9' the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided an
OSHA preemption challenge to New York City's asbestos abatement
ordinance providing that workers handling friable asbestos must hold
a city issued "asbestos handling certificate.' '92 The Second Circuit re-
jected the Third Circuit's primary purpose test, adopting instead a
"substantial purpose" test for preemption. The court noted that
"[siection 18 [of the OSH Act] and the Revised Construction Stan-
dard . . . preclude[s] the City from promulgating an 'occupational
safety or health standard' that relates to the issue of abatement work-
ers' exposure to asbestos.'93 The city argued that the purpose of the
ordinance was to control air pollution resulting from improperly han-
dled asbestos, and that any effect on the OSHA preempted field of
regulation-worker health and safety-was incidental.9 The court ex-
plained that a purpose other than OSHA's may allow the ordinance to
avoid preemption by the OSH Act: "[l]ocal legislation enacted for the
sole purpose of protecting the public health would not, on its face, be
preempted." 95 However, the court found that the city ordinance had a
88. Id. at 137.
89. See Fernandez, supra note 9, at 1233.
90. New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 868 F.2d 621, 626 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 492 U.S. 920 (1989).
91. 855 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1988).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 55.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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dual purpose: to protect public health from air pollution, and to
"safeguard employee health and safety." 9 At this point the court re-
fused to engage in exploring the legislative purposes behind the ordi-
nance, as would be required under a "primary purpose" test, because
this would lead the court "down an unmarked avenue of inquiry into
legislative motive.'' 97 Instead, the court adopted a preemption test
whereby those portions of the city's ordinance that had a substantial
legitimate purpose apart from promoting occupational health and
safety for employees at the workplace would survive. 98
3. A Purpose and Effects Test
In Associated Industries of Massachusetts v. Snow,99 the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered a challenge to
Massachusetts' regulation of the asbestos removal industry. The court
held that the state act regulating asbestos removal procedures was not
preempted by the OSHA asbestos standard, noting that with the ex-
ception of provisions regarding respirators and employee health moni-
toring, there was acceptable interplay between the state's exercise of
police powers and the federal government's regulation of occupational
safety and health.100 Snow acknowledged that a state's written intent
alone would be inadequate to protect a state statute that regulated in a
field Congress had reserved to itself.' 10 The court looked to both the
purpose and effect of the state law. If the general effect of the state
law fell outside the occupied field and there was no conflict with the
federal provision, then the court would hold the state law to be a law
of general application with a permissible purpose rather than a con-
flicting one.102 If, however, the effect of the state law fell primarily
within the field of occupational safety and health, it would be pre-
empted regardless of an alternative state purpose. 03
Those challenging the state regulation in Snow claimed that Massa-
chusetts was altering the balance of workplace concerns struck by the
OSH Act. 104 The court rejected the political-balance argument, ruling
that the state statute was not preempted merely because it enhanced
96. Id. at 56.
97. Id. at 57.
98. Id.
99. 898 F.2d 274 (1st Cir. 1990).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 278.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 279-80.
104. Id. at 282.
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the protection of the public from exposure to asbestos. 05 In the ab-
sence of any conflict between the state and federal purposes, the court
found no competing interests to be balanced and no preemption of the
state regulation.'06
In the implied preemption cases discussed above, Congress has been
attributed the purpose of occupying a particular field of regulation.
Rather than automatically preempting any state law that intrudes into
the field, the courts have explored the state's legislative purpose to see
if it contradicted an expressed or implied congressional purpose to ex-
clude the state from this area of regulation. Only when the state's pur-
pose was the same as the federal purpose would the court find
weakness with the congressional claim of exclusive jurisdiction. The
application of these tests effectively opened the doors for the states to
oversee activity already regulated by OSHA, but for different rea-
sons. 107 A state's environmental regulation could survive if it did not
present an actual obstacle to the operation of the federal regulatory
scheme. However, the door opened by the purpose tests did not re-
main open long.
E. Gade: Closing The Door On The Purpose Tests
In Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n,1°  Illinois ar-
gued that two state statutes which licensed laborers and machine oper-
ators handling hazardous wastes were not preempted by the OSH
Act.1°9 The state asserted that preemption was inappropriate because
the state laws did not conflict with the federal scheme and did not
purport to regulate occupational safety and health in the manufactur-
ing sector as a primary goal. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court concluded
the state regulations were impliedly preempted as conflicting with the
full purposes and objectives of the OSH Act." 0 A plurality of the
105. Id. at 283.
106. Id.
107. See Fernandez, supra note 9, at 1201.
108. 112 S. Ct. 2374 (1992).
109. The Solid Wastes Management Association challenged Illinois' Hazardous Waste Crane
and Hoisting Equipment Operators Licensing Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111, para. 7701-7717
(1989), and the Hazardous Waste Laborers Licensing Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 7801-
7815 (1989), claiming that the state acts were preempted by regulations issued by the Occupa-
tional Health and Safety Administration pursuant to mandates in the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986, which were designed "to promulgate standards for the health
and safety protection of employees engaged in hazardous waste operations." 29 U.S.C. § 655
(1986).
110. The state acts expressed dual legislative purposes of promoting job safety and protect-
ing "life limb and property." Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct.
2374 (1992).
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Court, led by Justice O'Connor, warned that preemption should not
rely solely on comparing legislative purposes because such a decision:
would enable state legislatures to nullify nearly all unwanted federal
legislation by simply publishing a legislative committee report
articulating some state interest or policy-other than frustration of
the federal objective-that would be tangentially furthered by the
proposed state law . . . [Any state legislation which frustrates the
full effectiveness of federal law is rendered invalid by the Supremacy
clause.""'
The plurality's test was based on the impact of state legislation on
the federally occupied field, a field the Court described as the federal
regulation of the workplace "to assure so far as possible every work-
ing man and woman in the Nation safe and healthy working condi-
tions. ""112 The Court further stated that field preemption exists "where
the scheme of federal regulation is 'so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress. left no room for the States to supplement
it.'"113
In its analysis, the plurality repeated the Court's earlier statement
that "[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone" in pre-
emption, to be "discern[ed] . . . by examin[ing] the explicit statutory
language and the structure and purpose of the statute." ' 14 However,
the lack of an expressed congressional intent to preempt did not deter
the ruling of preemption. The Court held that the preemptive effect of
the OSH Act extends to coincidental legislation that attempts to ad-
vance the same goals as the OSH Act, because "Congress sought to
promote occupational safety and health while at the same time avoid-
ing duplicative, and possibly counter-productive regulation." ' ' The
111. 112 S. Ct. at 2387 (quoting Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 651-52 (1971)). The Court
alsol described the relationship between the purpose of the state law and the effect of the state
law as a way of defining the preempted field: A "part of the preempted field is defined by
reference to the purpose of the state law . . . another part of the field is defined by the state
law's actual effect." Id. at 2386 (quoting English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 84 (1990)).
A troublesome part of the opinion is a statement which brings a new term to the discussion.
After discussing the relationship between purpose and effect, the decision explains that the pur-
pose of the state act and its effect on the federally occupied field define "the impact of a state
law on a federal scheme." Id. at 2387.
112. Id. at 2382.
113. Id. at 2383 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
114. Id. (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985)).
115. Id. at 2385. The plurality continued:
Our review of the Act persuades us that Congress sought to promote occupational
safety and health while at the same time avoiding duplicative, and possibly counter-
productive, regulation. It thus established a system of uniform federal occupational
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plurality noted that preemption may also be based on conflict with the
method chosen by Congress to achieve its goal in a particular field. In
the case of the OSH Act, the method required is the adoption of a
state plan by the federal OSHA administrator.'"6 This finding of
method preemption is best supported by the statutory language. How-
ever, the fact that a method is prescribed for the states' "takeover" of
the OSHA scheme does not compel the conclusion that the use of any
other method was prohibited."17
The Court's three opinions led Justice Kennedy to comment that
"[t]he Court's previous observation that our pre-emption categories
are not 'rigidly distinct,' . . . is proved true by this case,"" 8 and dem-
onstrate the unresolved state of the preemption doctrine today. Justice
Kennedy, concurring with the decision, disagreed that the OSH Act's
preemption needs to be implied. He found that section 18 of the OSH
Act, through negative implication, expressly preempts supplementary
state legislation. " 9 However, Justice Kennedy took issue with the ease
health and safety standards, but gave States the option of pre-empting federal regula-
tions by developing their own occupational safety and health programs .... To allow
a State selectively to "supplement" certain federal regulations with ostensibly noncon-
flicting standards would be inconsistent with this federal scheme of establishing uni-
form federal standards, on the one hand, and encouraging States to assume full
responsibility for development and enforcement of their own OSH programs, on the
other.
Id.
116. Id. at 2385.
[Ilt is not enough to say that the ultimate goal of both federal and state law is the
same. A state law is also pre-empted if it interferes with the methods by which the
federal statute was designed to reach th[at] goal. The OSH Act does not foreclose a
State from enacting its own laws to advance the goal of worker safety, but it does
restrict the ways in which it can do so. If a State wishes to regulate an issue of worker
safety for which a federal standard is in effect, its only option is to obtain the prior
approval of the Secretary of Labor, as described in § 18 of the Act.
Id. at 2386 (citations omitted).
117. Id. at 2384.
The OSH Act as a whole evidences Congress' intent to avoid subjecting workers and
employers to duplicative regulation; a State may develop an occupational safety and
health program tailored to its own needs, but only if it is willing completely to displace
the applicable federal regulations.
Id.
118. Id. at 2384 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
119. Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, stated:
Though I concur in the Court's judgment and with the ultimate conclusion that the
state law is pre-empted, I would find express pre-emption from the terms of the fed-
eral statute. I cannot agree that we should denominate this case as one of implied pre-
emption. The contrary view of the plurality is based on an undue expansion of our
implied pre-emption jurisprudence which, in my view, is neither wise nor necessary.
Id. at 2388-89.
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by which the plurality was willing to strike the state's exercise of po-
lice powers. 10
In Gade, the conflict between the justices raises a concern with the
approach taken by Justice O'Connor. It entails what Justice Kennedy
described as the Court's attempt to guess whether Congress intended
to exclude states based on a "free-wheeling judicial inquiry into
whether a state statute is in tension with federal objectives [which]
would undercut the principle that it is Congress rather than the courts
that preempts state law.' 121 This Article advances a "dynamic pur-
pose" preemption test that specifically addresses this concern by mak-
ing the preemption inquiry one of statutory construction that limits
the role of courts when construing state legislation under a state's po-
lice powers. However, before reaching the discussion on dynamic
methods, another approach is worth considering.
F. An Open Policy Approach
Balancing the constitutional principles involved in preemption
forces courts to engage in policy considerations to determine whether
the importance of state regulation in a particular area outweighs the
importance of keeping a federal scheme free of interference by state
regulation. If courts were to openly engage in such policy balancing,
however, they might be accused of deciding cases based on judges'
120. Id. at 2390. Justice Souter, joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens and Thomas, con-
cluded that the OSH Act does not preempt non-conflicting state occupational safety and health
regulation. Id. at 2391-95 (Souter, J., concurring).
This position was raised by Judge Easterbrook in a dubitante opinion accompanying the Sev-
enth Circuit's conclusion that the OSH Act preempted the Illinois statutes. National Solid
Wastes Management Ass'n v. Killian, 918 F.2d 671, 685 (7th Cir. 1990), aff'd sub nom. Gade v.
National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374 (1992). Dubitante is a "[term affixed
to the name of a judge, in the reports, to signify that he doubted the decision rendered."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 499 (6th ed. 1990). Judge Easterbrook took issue with the court of
appeals' test because state provisions could have been read as "an option for the states, not like
a constraint." Killian, 918 F.2d at 685. Furthermore, he disagreed because the coexistence of
federal and state schemes is a common occurrence. Killian, 918 F.2d at 686.
121. Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2389.
The plurality would hold today that state occupational safety and health standards
regulating an issue on which a federal standard exists conflict with Congress' purpose
to "subject employers and employees to only one set of regulations." ... This is not
an application of our pre-emption standards, it is but a conclusory statement of pre-
emption, as it assumes that Congress intended exclusive federal jurisdiction. I do not
see how such a mode of analysis advances our consideration of the case.
Our decisions establish that a high threshold must be met if a state law is to be pre-
empted for conflicting with the purposes of a federal Act. Any conflict must be "ir-
reconcilable ... The existence of a hypothetical or potential conflict is insufficient to
warrant the pre-emption of the state statute."
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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private views and values. Courts would have to reach an equilibrium
that takes into account the fitness of states to respond to particular
issues in their jurisdiction through the power reserved under the Tenth
Amendment, the congressional mandate to insure the free flow of
commerce, and the need for states to fulfill their roles as laboratories
while protecting the supreme character of federal laws."
An open policy based preemption analysis would have courts deter-
mine the degree and manner in which a state regulation impacts a fed-
eral scheme and balance the "harm" suffered by the congressional
design against the "harm" suffered by the state if it is unable to
achieve its own alternative purpose. Weighing the harm to the state
would take into account the ability of the state to achieve the same
goal through less intrusive regulation. Under a policy based analysis,
conflict preemption would require an exposition of the judges' rea-
sons why in a particular instance the harm suffered by the state in the
loss of its regulation is outweighed by the national harm. Harm to the
national interest would include interference with interstate commerce,
impairment of needed uniformity in an area of national regulation,
and interference with a predominantly national interest or an individ-
ual constitutional right. Harm to the state would include the erosion
of state police power, loss of state sovereignty under the Tenth
Amendment, impairment of the state's ability to govern in an area of
traditional state interest, and injury to a state's ability to respond to
an issue peculiar to that state.
Concerns regarding the need to safeguard the supremacy of federal
law could be resolved by making compliance with congressional intent
the predominant interest. Accordingly, when Congress expresses its
intent to exclude the state from an area of regulation, any interference
with carrying out that intent would tilt the scales in favor of preemp-
tion. When such concern is not clear, however, the courts would be
granted greater flexibility. It would then be up to Congress to correct
any "error" by the courts.
Under this approach, state regulation that advances the purpose of
a federal statute or does not impede the execution of a federal act
might be sustained even if it had some impact on the federally occu-
pied field. A court would no longer strike state regulation merely be-
122. This balance between state and federal powers is not new. Justice Stone openly advo-
cated such a legislative and political role for the Court when deciding whether federal law barred
state regulation. He called for the Court to explore the "nature and extent of the burden" which
the state regulation imposes on interstate commerce, and whether the "relative weights of the
state and national interests involved" are such as to make inapplicable the rule that interstate
commerce should flow freely and regulated solely by Congress. See Noel T. Dowling, Interstate
Commerce and State Power-Revised Version, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 547, 551 (1947).
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cause it had intruded on an "occupied" field. Courts would no longer
base part of their preemption analysis on the myth that it was prevent-
ing the altering of a "balance" reached in Congress to "go this far
and no further" in executing a federal scheme.
Another advantage to such an approach is that Congress may be
prompted to express its preemptive intent by stating it clearly in legis-
lation rather than risking judicial misinterpretation under an implied
preemption analysis ,121 Congress could achieve this by two means.
First, it could use a savings clause, stating that nothing in a particular
act is to be interpreted as prohibiting a state from enacting further
regulation within prescribed parameters. Second, and alternatively,
Congress could adopt an exclusivity clause declaring a particular area
of regulation within the exclusive control of Congress. With these two
clauses and implied preemption based on the balancing of policy con-
siderations, it seems possible to address the policy concerns behind the
Supremacy Clause without unduly limiting the states in their exercise
of police power.
G. Dublino: A Policy Case?
An example of the balancing of interests a policy based test would
entail is New York State Department of Social Services v. Dublino.I24
The case resolved whether the federal Work Incentive Program (WIN)
of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) preempted New
York welfare rules.' The New York rules terminated welfare pay-
ments for failure to obtain employment at an earlier date than WIN's
provisions. As with many cases under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, Dublino involved an area traditionally regulated by the
states that had been claimed by Congress through federal legislation.
To decide preemption, the Court focused on New York's "legitimate
interest in ensuring that limited welfare funds be spent on behalf of
those genuinely incapacitated and most in need . . ".."126 Balancing
123. In the case of the OSH Act, if courts err by limiting preemption as to a particular facet
of occupational safety and health, Congress can always correct the mistake simply by passing
appropriate legislation. It is unlikely that there would be a significant reduction of federal regu-
latory capacity since such an intrusion into the federally occupied field would not be allowed by
the courts to reach the level of conflict. If the current preemptive scope of the OSH Act is not
limited, however, it will continue to bar state statutes that address real needs particular to a
state. While it is possible for a state to lobby Congress to "correct" instances where the court
has gone too far, it is more likely that Congress would respond out of its own national perspec-
tive than in response to a particular state.
124. 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 413.
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the state and federal interests, the Court noted that WIN and AFDC
were federal programs meant to cooperate with state action to carry
out a common goal. 12 7 This cooperative federalism is similar to that
embodied in the OSH Act, where Congress contemplates state partici-
pation in achieving the legislative goal of safe and healthy workplaces
for employees.
Because of the traditional state interest, the fields of regulation cov-
ered by AFDC and the OSH Act are specially suited for a test that
weighs the policies behind the federal and state acts. As long as the
state acts do not present a real obstacle to the operation of the federal
scheme, they should not give rise to the concerns that support preemp-
tion in situations involving a need for national uniformity or a domi-
nant federal interest such as in the registration of aliens. 12 This
approach would have the justices sit openly as a super-legislature,
however, thereby increasing the likelihood that the Court would be
perceived as deciding cases based on private legislative agendas. 2 9 To
be determining the social "value" of a particular state act and com-
paring it to the "value" of protecting federal supremacy may be a role
too uncomfortable for the Court. 30
IV. THE STATES AS "LABORATORIES" AND THEIR POLICE POWERS
The limitation of state police power due to the OSH Act's preemp-
tion is heightened by occupation of field through OSHA regulations.
As Justice Souter noted in Gade, the Court is unclear as to the man-
ner and extent to which the OSH Act has occupied the field, some-
times referring to the area occupied as the entire arena of
occupational safety and health while other times limiting the field to
an area occupied by an OSHA standard.' Because the OSH Act has
127. ld. at 411 n.9.
128. Id. at 421 ("[W]here coordinate state and federal efforts exist within a complimentary
administrative framework, and in the pursuit of common purposes, the case for federal pre-
emption becomes a less persuasive one.").
129. See Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the
Burger Court, 75 COLUnM. L. REv. 623, 652 n.212 (1975).
130. See Josd L. Fernandez, State Constitutions, Environmental Rights Provisions, and the
Doctrine of Self-Execution: A Political Question?, 17 HA~v. ENVTL. L. REV. 333, 381 n.246
(1993) ("The public's periodic re-discovery that at times the courts act according to personal or
political biases has long been a source of attacks against the courts. Ever since Marbury v. Madi-
son . . . the power of the U.S. Supreme Court . . . has provoked attacks that the Court has
appointed itself as a super-legislature.").
131. Still, whether the pre-emption at issue is described as occupation of each narrow
field in which a federal standard has been promulgated, as pre-emption of those regu-
lations that conflict with the federal objective of single regulation, or, as Justice KEN-
NEDY describes it, as express pre-emption .... the key is congressional intent, and I
find the language of the statute insufficient to demonstrate an intent to preempt state
law in this way.
Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2392 (1992).
19941
98 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:75
been found to preempt any field of activity for which OSHA issues a
"standard," '32 there is a need to contrast congressional versus agency
occupation of the field. These agency standards are not congressional
acts, but instead are a product of legislative delegation. Because field
preemption is based on protecting a congressional political balance,
when the basis for the challenge is an OSHA standard, the agency is
in effect allowed to define the political compromise.,33 Yet when Con-
gress enacted the OSH Act, it could not have forecasted the scope and
form of the standards OSHA would adopt.
When an agency standard represents a congressional compromise,
judicial treatment of the standard is filtered through the agency's un-
derstanding of the balance. Should an agency's interpretation of the
political basis for a statute, years after its enactment, be afforded the
weight to exclude nonconflicting state regulation from an entire field
of activity?"4 It is unlikely that Congress intended to limit the states
so much when it came to environmental protection and regulation. In
fact, there is evidence to the contrary. 3' Federal environmental sta-
tutes often permit and encourage state regulation of the same activity,
albeit at a more stringent standard. 3 6 In addition, it seems improper
to assign Congress such a significant erosion of state sovereignty
based on an agency's actions. If Congress wants essentially to elimi-
nate the role of the state in environmental regulation it should be re-
quired to express so in clear terms.
Requiring an expressed congressional intent to preempt would en-
sure compliance with the preemption doctrine's axiom that, whenever
possible, state exercises of police power should be respected. 37 At is-
132. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1993) (OSHA Hazard Communication Standard).
133. See Kefly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937) (extending preemption power to regulations
promulgated by agencies created by Congress); see also Hillsborough County v. Automated
Medical Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (concluding that an agency's power to preempt is lim-
ited by congressional preemptive intent behind the enabling federal act).
134. Concern is increased because OSHA may decide the preemptive scope of a standard
through informal proceedings. As one commentator explained regarding promulgation of the
Hazard Communication Standard, "[the OSHA rule indicates, however, that the agency paid
little attention to the need for careful substantive evaluation of the need for federal preemption
of state regulatory authority over chemical labeling." Richard J. Pierce, Regulation, Deregula-
tion, Federalism, and Administrative Law: Agency Power to Preempt State Regulation, 46 U.
PrrT. L. REv. 607, 666 (1985).
135. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1982) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1976) (Clean
Air Act).
136. 33 U.S.C. § 1370; 42 U.S.C. § 7416.
137. The analysis begins "with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States
... [are] not to be superseded ... unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator, 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). This doctrinal axiom has developed to
ensure the constitutionally mandated "federal-state balance." United States v. Bass, 404 U.S.
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sue is the "traditional . . . power of the states . . . to provide for the
public health, safety and morals."' 38 This power is not to be frus-
trated except pursuant to a "clear and manifest purpose of Con-
gress."13 9 An express intent requirement would also protect two basic
assumptions of federalism: (1) that the states hold a fount of "re-
served power" under the Tenth Amendment; and (2) that the states
act as "laboratories of experimentation" where, given the political
will, a single state could explore what the national consensus was not
ready to try. i'4
The concept of a new federalism, coupled with the limitations on
federal power imposed by the Constitution and the political structure
of the United States, maps a system that guarantees a national floor
of shared conditions and allows for the regulatory diversity required
to address a particular state's needs. 14' Today, the role of the states as
innovators is as important as ever. In part, this is the result of their
smaller political entities and more manageable bureaucracies . 42 The
smaller state bureaucracy also creates greater accountability, either
real or perceived, leading to increased political participation.
The states' legislative experiments also provide solutions that may
later be adopted on a national scale. 43 States have taken the lead with
"innovations such as zero-based budgeting, equal housing . . . no-
fault insurance ... gun control, pregnancy benefits for working
women, limited-access highways, education for handicapped children,
auto pollution standards, and energy assistance for the poor."' In
336, 349 (1971). Accordingly, the Court has stated that the striking of state acts that embody the
exercise of state police powers should take place only when it is "unmistakably . . . ordained [by
Congress]." Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
138. Barnes v. Glen Theaters, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
139. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. at 146 (1963); see also LAWR-
ENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTrrTroNAL LAW § 6-25 (2d ed. 1988); George Henderson, The Nu-
clear Choice: Are Health and Safety Issues Preempted?, 8 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 821, 841-42
(1980).
140. See Polybius, In Support of Strengthening the American Federal System, 2 PUBLrus 138
(1972) (The "New Federalism does make immense sense in our geographically vast American
Nation with wide diversity of physical, economic and social characteristics.").
141. Id.; see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (noting that federalist concept
was one where neither the federal nor state governments would rule alone).
142. Alan Greenspan, The Constitutional Exercise of the Federal Police Power: A Func-
tional Approach to Federalism, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1019, 1041 (1988).
143. "Sometimes, as in health care [regulatoryl experiments, what is learned from State ef-
forts may ultimately have a profound influence on national policy. In other cases, the lessons are
primarily valuable for possible imitation in other states and localities." OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 1993 § 20; see also
Virginia Gray, Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study, 67 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 1174 (1973).
144. Greenspan, supra note 142, at 1043 n.186.
19941
100 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:75
New Jersey,' 45 the role of the state as innovator is specially appropri-
ate in environmental regulation, where physical and economic differ-
ences make a state by state approach necessary. Congress has a
national focus and is not as prepared as states to address the geo-
graphical, social, political and economic diversity found throughout
the states. 46
Judge Posner articulates another value to the states' role. He ad-
vances the concept that allowing the states to remain somewhat inde-
pendent and competitive has value beyond allowing them the ability to
explore new ideas for regulation. 47 He argues that competition be-
tween states results in increased government efficiency. Federalism
parcels out power "among competing (not merely independent) insti-
tutions."'"s That competition takes the form of trying to make a state
the most attractive to citizens and industry by providing better service
at a lower tax cost. 49 In addition, despite cries to the contrary, na-
tional uniformity need not always be the preferred alternative.5 0
V. PUBLIC CHOICE, LEGISLATIVE. HISTORY, AND THE "POLITICAL
COMPROMISE"
Ultimately, preemption is an act of statutory interpretation. The
courts' traditional approach has been to determine the preemptive
145. See Barry G. Rabe, Environmental Regulation In New Jersey: Innovations and Limita-
tions, 21 PUBLIUs 83 (1991) (detailing New Jersey's contributions to novel legislation, including
the Environmental Clean-up Responsibility Act and the Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act).
146. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REY. 543, 547 (1954).
Another commentator has stated:
Frustrated in their efforts to protect the great laboratories of the nation (the creativity
and diversity of local government solutions to national problems which permit experi-
mentation and innovation) through judicial interpretation of the tenth amendment,
the states are now proceeding to explore new ways of achieving federal diversity
through economic, political, and state judicial arenas.
Robert H. Freilich, Federalism In Transition: The Emergence of New State and Local Strategies
in the Face of the Vanishing Tenth Amendment. 20 URB. LAW. 863, 866-67 (1988).
147. Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH. L.
Rav. 4 (1987) [hereinafter Posner, Economic Document].
148. Id. at 14.
149. "If state and local governments merely were administrative conveniences decreed by the
central government, they would be no obstacle to centralization, i.e., to monopoly government.
To the extent they are independent of the central government they provide real, if today very
limited, competitive alternatives for consumers of governmental services." Id. A more produc-
tive government could produce more unwanted rentseeking legislation, too. Id.
150. While it is possible that a state would try to make itself more attractive at the expense of
other states, this is unlikely because states may be limited in efforts to externalize the costs of
government due to congressional control over commerce and taxation.
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scope of an act by first seeking an expression of clear intent in the text
and legislative history.' If neither the statute's language nor the legis-
lative history provide a clear answer, courts decide whether the intent
to preempt should be implied based on the degree of conflict between
the state and federal law, or on the extent of occupation of the regu-
lated field. As stated earlier, once field occupation is found, the
courts will strike nonconflicting supplemental regulation based on the
myth of a political compromise at the time of enactment.15 2 The con-
cept of legislative compromise, though, assumes there exists a collec-
tive intent that can be ascribed to Congress. It requires the assumption
that, as to a specific issue, the legislators engaged in a rational, delib-
erate attempt to address existing societal needs and reached a compro-
mise as to the substance of a law addressing those needs. Defining
such a compromise also requires that the courts accept the existence of
a legislative history that they can turn to for exploring the substantive
positions of the legislators in order to delineate the parameters of the
compromise. These suppositions, however, have been placed in seri-
ous doubt by advocates of the law and economics school,' public
choice theorists, 5 4 and other scholars and jurists who argue against
any reliance on legislative history or who warn against relying solely
on the "original" legislative history. 5 5
151. "If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court . . . must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Chevron USA, Inc. v. National
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
152. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
153. See Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987,
100 HARv. L. Rav. 761, 774 (1987) [hereinafter Posner, Decline of Law]; see also ROBERT
COOTER & THOMAS ULLEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 9 (1988); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
PosrR, THE ECONOMIC SrRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 312 (1987).
154. The theory has been described as the "economic study of non-market decision making,
or simply the application of economics to political science." DENNIS C. MUE.LER, PUBuc
CHOICE 1 (1989). For the origins of public choice theory, see KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1963); DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND
ELECTIoNS (1958); JAMES M. BuCH.AN & GORDON TULLOCK, ThE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: Loom-
CAL, FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTIrUIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); ANTHONY DowNs, AN ECONOMIC
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); ROBIN FARQUHARSON, THEORY OF VOTING (1967).
155. For example, Justice Scalia rejects the use of legislative history because he doubts the
existence of congressional will. See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2488-
89 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (noting that congressional intent is irrelevant, that it is a judge's role to interpret the intent
of the statute, and that courts should not to try to determine the intent of legislators when they
passed the act); see also Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 738 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (advocating "plain meaning" interpretation of statutes); Note, Why
Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative History Today, 105 HARv. L. Rav. 1005 (1992).
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Public choice theory explains legislation as a byproduct of market
forces operating in the legislative arena. Legislators are perceived as
rational maximizers of their self-interest, selling the ability to produce
"rentseeking" legislation 56 to those groups with the greatest impact
on each legislator's chances for reelection. 57 The theory holds that a
small, discreet group affected either negatively or beneficially is more
likely to respond politically to further its interests. Such groups will
find it worthwhile to incur the costs of lobbying and organizing votes,
and will therefore have an impact on the legislative process dispropor-
tionate to their size. Larger, less defined groups do not obtain such a
representative voice, in part because of the "free rider" phenomena
that acts as a disincentive to political participation,'58 and in part be-
cause of the greater transactional costs involved in organizing larger
groups of people. 5 9 Accordingly, groups as large as "the majority of
the electorate" or "the poor" are often disadvantaged by legislation
on behalf of the smaller groups. 60 If the disadvantage to the majority
is large enough, it is justifiable to maintain that "legislative failure"
has occurred whereby the legislative result "diminish[es] rather than
increase[s the] citizen's average level of well-being."' 6'
At least two inferences follow from such a conclusion. First, at
some point, there is a need for courts to act on behalf of the majority
or public interest to "correct" for "legislative failure"' 62 resulting
156. Rentseeking legislation are those enactments that typically help small constituents by
imposing a "rent" on larger, less organized groups. See Posner, Economic Document, supra
note 147, at 14.
157. lfernard Grofman, Public Choice, Civic Republicanism, and American Politics: Per-
spectives of a "Reasonable Choice" Modeler, 71 TEx. L. Rav. 1541 (1993).
158. See Marc S. Gerber, Equal Protection, Public Choice Theory, and Learnfare: Wealth
Classkications Revisited, 81 GEo. L.J. 2141, 2157 (1993).
159. These transactional costs include "the costs of identifying the parties with whom one
has to bargain, the costs of getting together with them, the costs of the bargaining process itself,
and the costs of enforcing any bargain reached." RonrN P. MALOy, LAW AND EcoNohflcs: A
ComFARArrvE APPROACH "O THEORY AND PRACTICE 35 (1990).
160. Not all scholars have reached the same conclusion as to the role of the courts. See
Grofman, supra note 157. Grofman specifically rejects the idea that rentseeking, logrolling or
the self-interest of legislators necessarily make a politician's choice one that is properly corrected
by some sort of unflawed judicial process. To the contrary, he states "I argue that most of the
problems said to plague the legislative process also hold true for the process of judicial interpre-
tation if a majority of judges is required to agree on an interpretation of the text." Id. at 1546-
47.
Grofman advocates for a civic republican model of legislative thought, described as generally
believing that there is a "substantive concept of the public interest that cannot be reduced to an
aggregation process based on individual preferences. In short, they believe in some concept of
the public good that may be perceived, however dimly, by the citizenry, legislators, and judges."
Id. at 1549.
161. Id.
162. See Gerber, supra note 158.
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from "rentseeking" legislation. 63 Under these circumstances, courts
are asked to either amend a statute or interpret it, correcting a legisla-
tive failure regardless of the original legislative intent. Second, public
choice analysis leads to the conclusion that the legislative process pri-
marily involves the intent of legislators to get reelected. It follows that
each legislator had a particular bargain in mind at voting time, show-
ing that there is no collective intent'64 as to the substance of a law that
can be imputed to the lawmaking body. 65 The judicial attempts at
divining a collective legislative intent behind a political compromise
have been misguided. Public choice theory accommodates the inter-
play between two or more discrete groups, in opposition or otherwise
aligned on a particular issue, resulting in a legislative event that bal-
ances the different forces at work. However, such a balance or bar-
gain, despite its reflection in a political bargain that is embodied into
a statute, is different in quality from the "political compromise" that
[Ulnder public choice theory, the exclusion of the poor as a class from much of the
political process invokes the need for a process to correct the legislative failure that
occurs when statutes burden the class. The judiciary's "relative independence, coupled
with its power to invalidate statutory bargains by invoking the Constitution, make it
the branch of government most capable of guarding against the erosion of constitu-
tional protections under the pressure of special interestsgroups."
Id. at 2159 (citing A.C. Prichard, Government Promises and Due Process: An Economic Analy-
sis of the "New Property," 77 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1072 (1991)).
163. Lynn A. Stout, Strict Scrutiny and Social Choice: An Economic Inquiry Into Funda-
mental Rights and Suspect Classifications, 80 GEo. L.J. 1787, 1789 n. 18 (1992).
164. "The existence of agenda control makes it impossible for a court-even one that knows
each legislator's complete table of preferences-to say what the whole body would have done
with a proposal it did not consider in fact." Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U.
Cm. L. REv. 533, 547-48 (1983).
165. See generally Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public
Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 423 (1988) (exploring the rejection of legislative intent as a jurispruden-
tial tool in the interpretation of statutes, focusing specifically on the approaches of Justice Scalia
and Judge Easterbrook).
Two of the strongest advocates for rejecting legislative histories are Justice Scalia and Judge
Easterbrook. Judge Easterbrook limits the issues that can be interpreted under a statute to
"cases anticipated by [the statutes'] framers and expressly resolved in the legislative process."
Easterbrook, supra note 164, at 544.
The body as a whole, however, has only outcomes. It is not only impossible to reason
from one statute to another but also impossible to reason from one or more sections
of a statute to a problem not resolved .... [Jludicial predictions of how the legisla-
ture would have decided issues it did not in fact decide are bound to be little more
than wild guesses.
Id. at 547. Easterbrook also explains that each legislator may have a different design or intent
that resulted in a vote, and that in some instances the legislator may not have had any design
with regard to that particular piece of legislation. Id.; see also RoNALD Dwos, LAW's EsputE
317-27 (1986) (rejecting the possibility of discovering the mental state or intent of a collective
body) [hereinafter Dworkin, LAW's Emunej. But see Shepsle, Prospects for Formal Models of
Legislatures, 10 LEas. STUD. Q. 5, 10 (1985) (noting that the political strength and stability of
legislatures seems to betray some of the conclusions arrived at under the public choice theory).
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the courts impute to the legislatures when rejecting non-conflicting
supplemental state legislation. The balance achieved by competing
groups in search of rentseeking legislation merely represents what
those forces were able to "buy" from legislators at that particular
time. Such a compromise does not represent a collective legislative
conclusion as to the merits of the substance of a statute in addressing
a particular societal need. The intent of the enacting legislation was to
obtain the maximum individual political benefit that the "market
would bear" for their services. It is dangerous to rely on the result of
such bargaining in attempting to divine the legislators' consensus on a
particular issue.
Despite increasing rejection of the notion of an original intent or
"legislative history" illuminating an original text, there is little con-
sensus as to the extent and manner in which the courts should engage
in remedial judicial activism. Among public choice adherents, for ex-
ample, the conclusion that legislation does not result from a rational
search for the public interest does not lead necessarily to advocating
for judicial activisim. 166
Under the guise of interpreting statutes, courts have reconstructed
legislative acts based on updated understandings of the original in-
tent. 161 Courts have also devised other judicial strategies to avoid re-
sults clearly mandated by Congress. 168The question remains, however,
whether courts should give effect to the legislative act as enacted, use
an interpretive tool such as legislative history, or openly amend a stat-
ute on behalf of the public interest. A narrow, textualist view holds
that original intent as applied in a particular case must be divined only
from the text of the statute, rejecting any reliance on legislative his-
tory or other sources. 169 Justice Scalia argues that whatever the intent
of each member of Congress, the collective result is-lawful and effec-
tive and therefore the judiciary role should be restricted to "giv[ing]
fair and reasonable meaning to the text of the United States Code.' '170
Others, such as Judge Posner, urge "reconvening" the original legis-
lature and engaging in "imaginative reconstruction" to resolve an is-
166. Instead, the problem calls for caution in some minds: "[i]f the lawmaking enterprise
itself is irrational and incoherent, judicial activism in the name of rationality and coherence
becomes increasingly problematic." William N. Eskridge & Phillip P. Frickey, Legislation
Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era. 48 U. PrrT. L. REv. 691, 700 (1987).
167. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. Rav.
204 (1980).
168. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 20
(1988).
169. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L.
REV. 885, 894-902 (1985).
170. Pennsylva'nia v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
STA TUTOR Y INTERPRETA TION
sue. 171 Judge Posner admonishes the judiciary to adopt the frame of
mind of the enacting legislators and try to imagine how they would
apply the statute to the issue before the court. 7 2 Posner advocates fo-
cusing on the background of statutes, their structure, and the values
and attitudes surrounding them when enacted. From there he derives
the extent to which judges should modify or apply the statute.'73 Pos-
ner, however, would enforce legislative events that do not conform
with his view of where the public interest lies, even if the legislation is
rentseeking.1 74 Judge Posner distinguishes his position from Judge
Easterbrook's assertion that the legislatures have no unified purpose
by stating that "[iinstitutions act purposively, therefore they have
purposes. A document can manifest a single purpose even though
those who drafted and approved it had a variety of private motives
and expectations." 175
Professors Farber and Frickey would go one step further than Pos-
ner's communication approach by urging judges to consider the con-
sequences of possible statutory interpretations and subsequent
legislative events. 76 In Farber and Frickey's estimation, "to the extent
that the effects of various interpretations are relevant, subsequent leg-
islative history can help the judge determine current societal
norms,' 1 7 and therefore avoid a decision based solely on the judge's
"own personal preferences."' 78 Judge Easterbrook would reject the
use of any subsequent statutory history because it "dishonor[s] the
procedural aspects of the legislative process." 79
171. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the
Courtroom, 50 U. Cm. L. Ray. 800, 817 (1983) [hereinafter Posner, Statutory Interpretation].
172. Id. Judge Posner relies on the "communication" theory of legislation, analogizing
judges to platoon leaders in the field receiving orders from superiors at headquarters, who do
not address all the circumstances before the platoon leader. See Richard A. Posner, Legal For-
malism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W.
Rs. L. REv. 179, 189-90 (1986) [hereinafter Posner, Legal Formalism].
173. Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 171, at 818; cf. HENRY M. HART & ALBERT
SACKS, TiE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PRO3LEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1156
(1958) (taking a position similar to Posner's, but suggesting that judges should ignore interest
groups, prejudice, popular ignorance and other things which deflect from the single-minded pur-
suit of the public interest).
174. For a discussion of rentseeking, see supra notes 156-61 and accompanying text. The
enforcement of rentseeking legislation, regardless of it consequences, may give rise to high politi-
cal costs from the legislative bargain. These costs may not readily appear, however, if the statute
is neither applied nor interpreted in a politically costly manner before the enacting legislators'
terms expire.
175. See Posner, Legal Formalism, supra note 172, at 196.
176. Farber & Frickey, supra note 165, at 425.
177. Id. at 467.
178. Id. at 468 ("The upshot is that even an original intent perspective has room for evolving
statutory interpretation.").
179. Easterbrook, supra note 164, at 539.
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VI. THE DYNAMIc INTERPRETATION METHOD
One of the more interesting responses to the new understanding of
the legislative process has been the open judicial "correction" of legis-
lation or a "dynamic" statutory interpretation.' s Even within this
group, however, the degree of judicial activism varies from those who
believe courts should overturn and amend statutes regardless of their
text,'' to a more restrained invitation 2 to apply subsequent legisla-
tive history and current values when interpreting "ambiguous" sta-
tutes. "I
An advocate of the less radical form of dynamic statutory interpre-
tation is William Eskridge. Professor Eskridge argues that judges
should not be restricted from considering "subsequent interpreta-
tional history, related constitutional developments, and current socie-
tal facts."'' 4 Eskridge supports this position by reference to the
judicial practice of interpreting the Constitution by relying on consid-
erations beyond the text or the historical background. 5 In addition,
180. See, e.g., Gumo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR TmE AGE OF STATUTES (1992); LAw's
Emrpa, supra note 165; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 Mscst.
L. REv. 20 (1988); and William N. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1479 (1987) [hereinafter Eskridge, Interpretation].
181. Richard Epstein calls for increased judicial intervention to correct the effect of rent-
seeking legislation in the area of commercial regulation. Richard Epstein, Toward a Revitaliza-
tion of the Contract Clause, 51 U. Cm. L. REv. 703, 711-15 (1984). His work has been described
as stating that the "courts should strike down most of the federal legislation of the last 50 years
in order to protect free markets and private property." Daniel Farber, With Liberty for Some,
N.Y. Ti MEs, Feb. 13, 1994, at A28; Cf. CALaBnEsi, supra note 180, which proposes that courts
should be able to amend or overrule statutes in order to update them. He asserts that under a
dynamic approach courts should:
treat statutes as if they where no more and no less than part of the common law. At
other times it [the dynamic approach] would be used to encourage or even induce
legislative reconsideration of the statute. Employing a variety of techniques, the court
might begin a 'common law' process of renovation in the absolute law, update the
statute directly by replacing it with new rules .. . or do no more than create a situa-
tion in which conscious legislative reconsideration of the law was made likely.
CALAaRESi, supra note 180, at 98.
182. See Dworkin, LAw's Eamunt, supra note 165 (adopting a "pragmatic" approach to dy-
namic statutory interpretation). Dworkin views the legislative process as beginning before enact-
ment and continuing up to application of the statute in a case. He argues that statutes should
"be read in whatever way follows from the best interpretation of the legislative process as a
whole." Id. at 337. Ultimately Dworkin calls for judges to make "whatever decision seems to
them best for the community's future, not counting on any form of consistency with the past as
valuable for its own sake." Id. at 95.
183. See William N. Eskridge, Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice
Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. RaV. 275, 338 (1988) [hereinafter Eskridge, Poli-
tics Without Romance] ("A statute must be interpreted with an eye to what it's becoming, not
what it was originally.").
184. See Eskridge, Interpretation, supra note 180.
185. Id.
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he further justifies this approach by pointing to conventional judicial
practices when interpreting the common law.)8 6 He criticizes the no-
tion that judges should consider only the text and historical context of
statutes when interpreting them. 1 7 Rejecting the traditional limita-
tions, he argues that judges should interpret statutes "dynamically."
That is, statutes should be construed "in light of their present socie-
tal, political and legal context. "1 88
Eskridge's "dynamic" method is supported by a series of "plural-
ist" assumptions that are accepted in the dynamic purpose approach
advanced by this Article. The primary assumptions are that a func-
tional representative democracy exists in our polity, that the legisla-
tures are the primary lawmaking bodies, and that the language of a
statute will often be sufficient to resolve a given case. 89
Under Eskridge's dynamic approach, there are three considerations
for courts to weigh in statutory analysis. First is the interpreter's pres-
ent day understanding of the text, which is used to determine the lim-
its imposed by the language of the text.190 Second is "the original
legislative expectations surrounding the statute's creation."' 9 The
third consideration includes the "subsequent evolution of the statute
and its present context." 92 Accordingly, if an issue is clearly resolved
in the text of the statute, Eskridge advises following the directive of
the statute. 93 If, however, the text is "ambiguous" on the relevant
point, the language of the act is of limited utility. The text may be
shown to be ambiguous when stated purposes are contradicted in the
language of the statute.' t A statute may also be "ambiguous" when
the application of its language would lead to results that seem to con-
tradict the historical basis for the statute or lead to a ridiculous re-
sult. 19 Thus, when the text of a statute is not clear and when the
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.; see also LAW's EMPIE, supra note 165; Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the
Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204, 205 (1980) (advocating a "nonoriginalist" irter-
pretation of the statutes and the Constitution). For a perspective rejecting the "dynamic" ap-
proach, see Craig W. Dallon, Interpreting Statutes Faithfully-Not Dynamically, 1991 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 1353 (criticizing the dynamic approach for "not . adequately recogniz[ing] the strong
historical legitimacy of originalism").
189. See Eskridge, Interpretation, supra note 180.
190. Id. at 1483.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Eskridge bases this practice on rule of law principles. Id.; see also Michael S. Moore, A
Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 277, 313-18 (1985).
194. See Eskridge, Interpretation, supra note 180, at 1483.
195. Id.; see also United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25 (1948) (explaining that criminal
statutes should not be interpreted narrowly solely upon their language, when to do so in effect
"override[s] common sense and evident statutory purpose").
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"original legislative expectations have been overtaken by subsequent
changes in society and law,"' 9 there would be the type of ambiguity
that is best resolved by a dynamic approach.
VII. Ti DYNAMC PURPOSE METHOD
In addition to the "ambiguity" situations Eskridge explains, this
Article submits there is another instance when a dynamic interpreta-
tional approach is especially suited: when a statute's text manifests a
"dynamic" purpose. A statute's purpose may be characterized as dy-
namic when its text implies a changing degree of regulation as time
elapses or conditions evolve. When such a purpose exists, the thresh-
old for the dynamic interpretation of a statute has been crossed. The
dynamic purpose method is not offered in substitution of Eskridge's
approach, nor as an endorsement of those who would enforce a legis-
lative bargain regardless of the possible harm to the majority. Instead,
this Article endeavors to refine one aspect of the "activist" end of the
continuum.
Some federal acts express in their text the purpose of imposing a set
amount and/or type of regulation. For example, the Federal Tobacco
Inspection Act was held to preempt Georgia's tobacco classification
law in Campbell v. Hussey.197 This act sets "uniform standards for
classification to avoid manipulation and unreasonable fluctuations in
prices and quality determinations for the protection of producers and
others engaged in commerce and the public interest therein." 19 While
the act is aimed at evils presented by the disruption of interstate com-
merce and price gouging of consumers, the law has as a goal the set-
ting of uniform national tobacco standards. 199 This goal of nationally
uniform standards would be thwarted if a state is allowed to modify
or supplement the federal regulation. In this Article, laws such as the
Federal Tobacco Inspection Act will be designated "static purpose
statutes," or simply "static statutes."
Other federal acts have a more fluid character, however, indicating
the need to have the type and breadth of regulation effecting them
change as economic or technological factors evolve. These acts require
change to achieve a stated purpose. These statutes have language indi-
cating that any enacted regulation, be it the protection of a resource
or the control of an activity, should be altered as the desired result
becomes more feasible. These federal statutes may occupy a field
196. See Eskridge, Interpretation, supra note 180, at 1484.
197. 368 U.S. 297 (1961).
198. Id. at 299.
199. Id. at 301.
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through pervasive regulation yet not embody the intent to exclude
nonconflicting supplemental state regulation.
An example is the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.2 °° The act's
approach to water pollution control includes the concept of increas-
ingly stringent regulations on the discharge of pollutants until all dis-
charges of pollutants into navigable waters ceases. 2 1 Its language and
structure evinces a purpose different in character from that of
"static" statutes.m The Water Pollution Act mandates movement
from an original level of regulation to a more stringent standard as
time elapses and new technology is developed. Such a statute has a
changing or "dynamic purpose," and for this Article will be labeled a
"dynamic statute."
It is sensible to view "field preemption" as merely a form of con-
flict that may be labelled "jurisdictional conflict." The conflict in
such instances results from the state's intrusion into an area reserved
solely for federal control. However, such an exclusionary intent by
Congress should be expressed in the text of the statute rather than
judicially implied in light of the broad preemptive scope that results
from the implication of such conflict to most federal legislation. A
key premise of the method advocated in this Article is that preemption
cases involving dynamic federal statutes do not present jurisdictional
conflict with state regulations advancing the same goals as the federal
act, unless the congressional prohibition on such state regulation is
expressed. This hypothesis rejects the notion of political compromise
as the basis from which courts give meaning to statutes. 2 3 Because
there is no intrusion into an implied reserved jurisdiction, there are no
''congressional toes to step on" and the supremacy of the federal
voice is not diminished.
Based on the static/dynamic differentiation, it is possible to engage
in an implied preemption analysis that no longer focuses merely on
whether Congress has chosen to regulate in a particular field. The pro-
posed test safeguards any textually expressed limitation on state action
by finding conflict with the state legislation even if the state legislation
200. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1377 (1976).
201. See id. § 1371 (stating that the goal of the Clean Water Act is that "the discharge of
pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985").
202. The Clean Water Act allows a state to adopt water pollution control standards which
are more stringent than those promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency. Id. §§
1251(b), 1370 (1976).
203. The assumption that the concept of the political compromise is bankrupt is supported
both by the new understanding of the legislative process resulting from public choice theory and
by the realization that the court, even if able to poll the individual enacting legislators, would be
unlikely to determine the true intent behind statute. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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purports to advance the same type of regulation as the federal act.
The basis for preemption in such an instance would be the conflict
with the statute's static purpose. However, in cases involving dynamic
statutes, preemption would occur only if the state scheme is in actual
conflict with the federal scheme. Accordingly, once a court determines
the character, dynamic or static, of a federal statute, it would proceed
to determine the degree of conflict presented by the state statute.
VIII. COMPARING THE TESTS
While this Article acknowledges that preemption doctrine terminol-
ogy is confusing and often interchangeable, for purposes of compar-
ing the proposed dynamic approach with the Gade plurality test this
Article divides the models of federal and state conflict into three
groups: purpose conflict preemption; interference conflict preemp-
tion; and method conflict preemption. Purpose conflict occurs in sev-
eral configurations, all involving conflict with an expressed statutory
purpose. Under this type of conflict, the express intent of the federal
law excludes state regulation, or a state act contradicts the express
purpose or goal of a federal act calling for national uniformity in an
area of regulation.204 Method conflict occurs when the state regulation
conflicts with a federal, expressed, statutorily required procedure or
method for any state supplemental regulation in a particular area. °0
In these instances, courts would have to conclude that the state is en-
gaging in the type of regulation that is only permissible in accordance
with the prescribed method. If the state is not following the prescribed
method, the state act would be struck.
The state statute may also present a conflict by interfering with the
operation of a federal scheme of regulation. Under the proposed ap-
proach, interference conflict preemption would depend on the degree
and type of impact on the federal scheme and on whether the federal
statute was dynamic or static.2 Interference conflict preemption
would include those instances where the state law requires persons to
act in violation of federal law, an obvious contradiction of the Su-
premacy Clause. Also included are those situations where the opera-
tion of state law creates a physical obstacle or otherwise significantly
204. See Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961).
205. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988).
206. The relation between the federal law and the state law will fall on a continuum ranging
from
conflicts which are direct and unavoidable in every case through conflicts in which the
state law would in some way interfere with or impinge upon the operation of the
federal law in every case, to interference in some cases, to the extreme point at which
the operation of the state law is recognized as utterly irrelevant to the federal law.
Kenneth L. Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L. Rav. 515, 519.
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discourages or blocks the operation of a federal law. 207 Except for the
first instance above, in the remaining interference conflict situations,
preemption would depend on the degree of interference. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that a state statute "neutral" on its face may
interfere with the federal scheme by increasing the administrative bur-
den of the regulated entity, making noncompliance with the federal
act more likely. Similarly, a "neutral" state statute that increases the
regulatory load may interfere by creating confusion in the regulated
community. Whether a state statute advances, impedes, or is neutral
in its operation on a federal scheme remains a factual issue.
In those cases where the scope of intended preemption or method
for state regulation is clearly expressed in a federal act, and the statu-
tory purpose or method used in a state act contradicts the federal act's
expressed purpose, the issue is one of express preemption and the re-
sults should be the same regardless of test applied. Here, the state act
must yield to insure the supremacy of the federal voice. Therefore, the
discussion here will focus on those instances when the courts must de-
termine preemption based on factors other than a clear statement
from Congress.
It is possible, however, to classify four interactions between federal
and state laws where implied preemption must be decided based on a
comparison of the respective statutory purposes, compliance with fed-
eral method, and the effect or impact that the state law has on the
federal scheme.
In the first situation, both federal and state laws have similar statu-
tory purposes and the effect of the state law on the federal scheme is
not negative." The effect on the operation of the federal scheme may
be either neutral or positive. In the second instance, the purpose of
the laws again is the same but the effect of the state law on the federal
scheme is negative, that is, interfering to a considerable degree with
the operation of the federal scheme. In the third instance, the federal
and state laws have different statutory purposes and the effect of the
state law on the federal scheme is neutral. In the fourth instance, the
federal and state laws have different purposes and the effect of the
state law on the federal scheme is negative.
207. Hirsch sees two types of possible "conflict." A narrow reading of conflict is when "the
federal and state laws require a defined group of persons to act in contrary ways." Id. at 526. A
broader reading of conflict is when the federal law licenses certain activity but the state law
limits or prohibits a person's use of the federal license. Id.
208. "Negative" in this context means to include all the effect and impacts that impede, slow
down, discourage, or significantly prevent the federal goal or the operation of the federal regula-
tory scheme. "Neutral" statutes are those that, regardless of intentions or statutory language,
have neither a negative or positive effect.
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To proceed in the comparison, it is helpful to review these four in-
teractions using the Gade plurality's analysis to compare the effects
which would result from a dynamic purpose approach. In the first
situation the state act would be preempted if the court finds that Con-
gress has already occupied the field of regulation. The court would
imply a congressional intent to exclude the state, thereby creating a
purpose conflict situation. That the state law may in fact advance the
expressed federal purpose would be irrelevant. In the second instance,
the state statute may also be preempted because of purpose conflict in
that it also regulates in an occupied field. In addition, the state statute
would be preempted because of interference conflict with the opera-
tion of the federal scheme. In the third situation, under a Gade analy-
sis, a court may or may not find preemption depending on the degree
of "impact" that the state law is found to have on the federal scheme.
If the state regulation sufficiently invaded the federal arena, the court
would find purpose conflict preemption. The court would find con-
flict with the congressional intent, implied from the occupation of the
field, to exclude the state. In addition, if the state regulation was held
to be of the type that must be carried out in accordance with an ex-
pressed method, the state would face method conflict preemption. In
the fourth situation the case would be decided in a manner similar to
the third, but the deciding factor would be the degree of "impact" on
or conflict with the federal scheme. In these instances, the court
would find both purpose conflict and interference conflict preemp-
tion.
Under the proposed dynamic purpose analysis for implied preemp-
tion, applying the terminology developed above, "occupation of the
field" would not result in purpose conflict if the federal act has a
dynamic purpose. Such preemptive intent would apply only to express
preemption and would require a clear statement of Congress to that
effect. In the first situation, the state act would not be preempted un-
less the court finds that the state act's operation alters the balance of
regulation mandated in a static federal act. If the statute is static,
there would be purpose conflict with the federal goal. If the court
finds that the federal statute is dynamic, there would be no conflict
and therefore no preemption. In the second situation, the state statute
would be preempted because of conflict interference unless the impact
on the federal scheme was insubstantial. In addition, if the federal act
is static, the state statute would also fail because under purpose con-
flict the state is altering the static balance. In the third situation, if the
federal act is static, the state statute would be preempted if it at-
tempted to advance the purposes of a static federal statute. However,
if the federal statute is found to be dynamic, there would not be a
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purpose conflict and therefore no preemption. The fact that the state
is regulating in the occupied filed is not the deciding factor, because
the effects are not negative in the given example. If the state regula-
tion was of the type that required compliance with a mandated
method, however, the state statute might fail due to method conflict
preemption. In the fourth situation, the state statute may be pre-
empted because of interference conflict preemption regardless of
whether the federal purpose is static or dynamic.
As the comparison of results illustrates, the major differences be-
tween the static and dynamic approaches is in the third instance.
There, the effect of the dynamic purpose method is to allow noncon-
flicting state regulation in a federally occupied field if the federal stat-
ute has a dynamic purpose, a conclusion that the traditional test bars.
It is of note that if the state regulation, although advancing the goal
of a dynamic statute, is of the type that the dynamic statute permits
only in accordance with a prescribed method, the state must comply
with the method or suffer possible conflict preemption. Nevertheless,
there is no method conflict preemption when a state act advances the
purpose of a dynamic statute through regulation that is not of the
type that the federal act allows only pursuant to a specific method.
The distinction is illuminated by a hypothetical. Consider a state
statute regulating in a field occupied by a dynamic, federal act man-
dating a specific method for the issuance of "water color standards."
Assume the federal act to have as its statutory purpose "eliminating
the hazard posed by paint and ink contamination of our navigable
waters." The federal act could require that "water color standards be
promulgated only in accordance with a state plan that has been ap-
proved by the Federal Water Color Agency." In this hypothetical, the
state act's expressed purpose is to "minimize the economic dislocation
resulting from the effect of ugly landscape colors on real estate sales."
If the state enacts a "water color standard" without complying with
the federal act requirement to have the state plan approved, the state
could face method conflict preemption. However, if the state adopts a
regulation that prohibits the disposal of ink in land or water, the state
regulation may survive if the court finds that the state regulation is
not a "water color standard," regardless of its effect on water colors.
The point is that only the state's promulgation of a "water color stan-
dard" must comply with the mandated method or face preemption.
IX. THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT: A "DYNAMC
PURPOSE" STATUTE
The OSH Act is a dynamic purpose statute that does not preempt
nonconflicting complementary regulation of occupational health and
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safety by state environmental statutes. Both the language and the leg-
islative history of the OSH Act reflect its "dynamic" character. Given
its language, history and interpretational ambiguity, the OSH Act
should be interpreted in a manner that prevents the interference with
states' exercise of police powers to protect their citizens. The OSH
Act's language indicates a course of regulatory changes as new tech-
nology or economic developments or discovery of harmful effects
makes a greater degree of workplace protection "feasible."W The
concept of a static level of regulation is rejected by the text of the
OSH Act, which claims as its purpose "to assure so far as possible
every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful work-
ing conditions and to preserve our human resources."210 In addition,
the OSH Act does not reflect a congressional intent for national uni-
formity,21' and, as noted by Justice Souter in the Gade dissent, the
field of worker protection has traditionally been a state regulated
field.212
Also, there is no express preemption in the statute. The statute's
ambiguity as to the intended scope of implied preemption is illustrated
by the Court's difficulties in Gade, demonstrating that the text and
history of the OSH Act may lead to several understandings of the in-
tended preemptive scope. As Eskridge stated, "neither the majority
nor the dissenting opinion [nor the concurring opinion in Gade] found
decisive support for their views in the generally worded text or in the
legislative history of the statute. 2 13
Based on the OSH Act's language and legislative history, the OSH
Act is not seen as a model of regulation that would restrict the level of
workplace protection merely to avoid increased financial burdens on
industry.214 In American Textile Manufacturer's Institute, Inc. v.
Donovan, the Court held the OSH Act required a feasibility analysis
209. Linda G. Howard, Hazardous Substances in the Workplace: Implications for the Em-
ploymentRights of Women, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 807 n.47 (1981).
210. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1988). In addition, the OSH Act's language may be conformed with
an acceptance of supplemental state regulation. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management
Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374 (1992).
211. See Amellia Jeauelmen, Trashing State Criminal Sanctions?: OSHA Preemption Juris-
prudence in Light of Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Association, 30 AM. CliM. L.
REv. 373 (1993). The author notes that up to Gade, many courts found that:
congressional tolerance of diverse state plans indicated that its main concern was set-
ting a federal floor of standards-if th~states sought to build up from that floor with
supplemental regulation, they should be free to do so as long as the regulation does
not directly conflict with the federal standards.
Id. at 408.
212. Gade, 112 U.S. at 2391-92 (Souter, J., dissenting).
213. Eskridge, Interpretation, supra note 180, at 1484-85.
214. See Associated Indus. of Mass. v. Snow, 898 F.2d 274, 283 (lst Cir. 1990).
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rather than a cost-benefit analysis. 215 The Court noted that Congress
"plac[ed] the 'benefit' of worker health above all other considerations
save those making attainment of this 'benefit' unachievable.''216 In ad-
dition, the fact that a state under an approved plan is allowed to enact
greater protection than that afforded by the applicable OSHA stan-
dard is also evidence that the goal of the OSH Act is directional, not
static, heading toward increased workplace protection.
As to the need for national uniformity, such a pattern is simply not
supported by the regulatory scheme that Congress mandated. First,
the OSH Act, as noted in Associated Indus. of Mass. v. Snow, con-
templates regulation by other federal agencies and by states that have
submitted a plan for approval.2 17 In the OSH Act, Congress accepts
the states as enforcers of disparate occupational health and safety reg-
ulation as long as such regulation is more stringent than that man-
dated by OSHA.2 1 9 The result of compliance with the OSH Act's state
plan requirements would lead to "a literal Balkanization of job safety
and health," 2 19 a result which is difficult to reconcile with the concept
of a legislative "balance" that was not to be disturbed. Thus, the fed-
eral act does not evince the concern for national uniformity that is one
of the grounds for preemption with static federal statutes such as the
Federal Tobacco Inspection Act. 220
A dynamic purpose interpretation of the OSH Act is especially ap-
propriate because there is no express preemption language in the OSH
Act. There is also no credible legislative history or "legislative intent"
to support the myth of a political compromise. If the OSH Act em-
bodies a compromise, it is not as to the substance of the OSH Act,
but merely the result of the balance of forces of discreet groups in
search of rentseeking legislation. In addition, a dynamic purpose anal-
ysis allows the courts to safeguard the states' role as laboratories.
Such an analysis permits the courts to respond to the states' need to
215. 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
216. Id. at 509.
217. See Snow, 898 F.2d at 283. In Lapore v. National Tool & Mfg. Co., 540 A.2d 1296
(1988), the New Jersey court noted that:
OSHA does not reflect express congressional intent to preempt the field of occupa-
tional safety and health. To the contrary, as previously indicated, OSHA specifically
permits individual states to adopt a scheme of health and safety regulation along with
enforcement procedures so long as the standards are at least as vigorous as those re-
quired by OSHA and have been approved by the Secretary of Labor .... Beyond
that, OSHA gives states express authority to regulate areas of health and safety not
governed by an OSHA standard.
Id. at 1306.
218. See 29 U.S.C. § 667 (1988).
219. ROBERT D. MoAN, OSHA HANDnOOK, 1-6 (1987).
220. See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
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exercise their police powers over changing circumstances including the
failure of federal environmental statutes to protect the citizenry. 221
Under a dynamic purpose analysis, preemption under the OSH Act
is most convincing when based on conflict with the method by which
Congress determined that the field should be regulated. The OSH Act,
either expressly, through negative implication, or impliedly2 22 has
been found to preempt any state workplace occupational safety and
health standard223 that is not pursuant to a plan approved by the
OSHA administrator. However, the dictated method is a requirement
only if a state is engaging in the regulation of the occupational health
and safety field through state safety and health standards. If a state
law does not have as its purpose the regulation of the occupational
safety and health field through state standards, the argument for
method conflict is deflated unless a court finds that the state regula-
tion is a concealed occupational standard. Therefore, if a state's envi-
ronmental law, with the purpose of addressing issues other than
occupational safety and health, impacts on a field occupied by an
221. The states are faced with new hazards and limitations on the federal attempts to protect
from known hazards. The result is a plethora of state environmental statutes that attempt to fill
the need.
222. See supra notes 77-107 and accompanying text.
223. The issue of what is a standard and what is a general law comes up with apparently
different results in different types of cases. Both tort and criminal laws have been found not to
be a "standard." In Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48 (1st Cir. 1991), a tort action by a
worker exposed to epichlorohydrin, the issue was whether the OSH Act preempted the state tort
action. The court noted it was "aware of no case which holds that OSHA preempts state tort
law." Id. at 52 (concluding there was no reason "for an interpretation which would preempt
enforcement in the workplace of private rights and remedies traditionally 'fforded by state laws
of general application").
The court also noted that a great majority of courts have found that criminal laws which
might regulate actions at the workplace are also outside the scope of "occupational and health
standards." Id. n.5. See also National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Killian, 918 F.2d 671,
680 n.9 (7th. Cir. 1990), affd sub nom. Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 112
S. Ct. 2374 (1992) (noting that state tort laws are not standards within the meaning of 29 U.S.C.
§ 652(8)).
In People v. Pymm, 563 N.E.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. 1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 958 (1991), the
court reasoned that criminal laws of general application are ex post reactive measures, focusing
on conduct after an injury has occurred. As a result, they do not fit under the definition of
occupational standard; cf. California Labor Fed'n v. California Occupational Safety & Health
Standards Bd., 221 Cal. App. 3d 1547 (1990), where the court decided that California's Proposi-
tion 65 was a labor standard and therefore preempted by OSHA unless it was made part of the
state OSHA plan adopted pursuant to section 18 of the OSH Act. Proposition 65 read in part:
"No person in the course of doing business shall knowingly and intentionally expose any indi-
vidual to a chemical known to the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity without first
giving clear and reasonable warning to such individual . . ." Id. at 1551. It is possible to take
issue with the court's conclusion that proposition 65 is a standard. The law protects "any indi-
vidual," not just the employees of the "person ... doing business." In addition, the law on its
face would apply beyond the workplace. Id. at 1557.
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OSHA standard in a way that advances the goals of the OSH Act, the
concerns about compliance with the OSH Act's method are simply not
applicable. 224 Preemption under the OSH Act is properly limited to
those instance where a state attempts to promulgate an "occupational
safety and health standard," or when the state's impact on the OSHA
scheme is the proper basis for interference conflict preemption.
225
X. CONCLUSION
A dynamic purpose test provides a more accurate method for ascer-
taining and carrying out the intent of Congress. It permits the states
the flexibility needed to safeguard the exercise of police power in the
environmental arena, yet protects the federal interest in cases of con-
flict with Congress' intent or with the operation or character of a fed-
eral law. However, like any test that relies on the application of terms
such as "interference," "obstacle" or "conflict," its acceptance must
coincide with an understanding that ultimately there is no objective
test or judicial standard that would provide certainty in this area other
than limiting preemption to those cases where Congress expresses its
intent in the legislation.Y
224. The purpose of the state law is to be determined by the courts from the legislative lan-
guage and from the actual impact of the law. Accordingly, a state would not be able to simply
list a legislative purpose to avoid preemption. If the courts find that the actual effect of the state
law is to regulate worker safety and health, the law would be preempted as in conflict with the
method required by the OSH Act.
225. The Dublino Court explained:
If Congress is authorized to act in a field, it should manifest its intention clearly. It
will not be presumed that a federal statute was intended to supersede the exercise of
the power of the state unless there is a clear manifestation of intention to do so...
federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed.
New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 417 (1973) (quoting Schwartz v.
Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952)).
226. See Hirsch, supra note 206, at 534.
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